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The historical theory developed by Johann Gustav Droysen (1808–1884) stands out partly due to its consistent orientation towards didactical 
issues. Besides investigating the principles governing the historical method and the reasons that lead us to attribute the quality of being “historical” 
to certain portions of the past, it also devised answers to the question: “why should one write, study, and learn history?”. In short, Droysen argues 
that the main goal of studying history should be neither the assimilation of practical examples nor the memorization of particular facts, but rather 
the learning of what he called “historical thinking”. I believe that Droysen’s argument set in motion a very significant redefinition of historiogra-
phy’s didactical function. This article characterizes and contextualizes such redefinition, underlining some of its current potentials and limits.
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A didática da história de J. G. Droysen: constituição e atualidade
Resumo
A teoria da história desenvolvida por Johann Gustav Droysen (1808–1884) distingue-se, entre outros aspectos, pela sua consistente 
preocupação com temas didáticos. Além de investigar os princípios que regem o método de trabalho dos historiadores e de perscru-
tar os motivos que nos levam a considerar como “históricas” certas porções do passado, ela também fornece respostas à pergunta “por 
que escrever, estudar e aprender história?”. Em linhas gerais, Droysen propõe que a finalidade do estudo da história não deve ser nem 
a assimilação de exemplos práticos, nem a memorização de fatos particulares, mas o aprendizado do que designou “pensamento his-
tórico”. Com esse argumento, Droysen contribuiu, penso eu, para uma redefinição importante da função didática da historiografia. O 
presente texto caracteriza e contextualiza tal redefinição, discutindo também seus potenciais e limites.
Palavras-chave: teoria da história; ensino de história; historiografia alemã – século XIX.
La didáctica de la historia de J. G. Droysen: constitución y actualidad
Resumen
La teoría histórica desarrollada por Johann Gustav Droysen (1808–1884) se distingue, entre otras cosas, por su preocupación constante 
con temas didácticos. Además de investigar los principios que rigen el método de trabajo de los historiadores y examinar las razones 
que nos llevan a considerar como “históricos” ciertos pasados, ella también ofrece respuestas a la pregunta “¿por qué escribir, estudiar 
y aprender la historia?”. En resumen, Droysen sostiene que el objetivo principal del estudio de la historia no debe ser ni la asimilación 
de ejemplos prácticos ni la memorización de hechos particulares, sino el aprendizaje de lo que él llama “pensamiento histórico”. Con 
este argumento, Droysen contribuyó, creo, a una redefinición importante de la función didáctica de la escritura de la historia. Este tra-
bajo caracteriza y contextualiza tal redefinición, discutiendo también su actualidad y límites.
Palabras clave: teoría de la historia; enseñanza de la historia; historiografía alemana – siglo XIX.
La didactique de l’histoire de J. G. Droysen: constitution et actualité
Résumé
La théorie de l’histoire développée  par Johann Gustav Droysen (1808-1884) se distingue par sa inquiétude quant aux thèmes didactiques. En 
plus d’investiguer les principes régissant la méthode de travail des historiens et d’étudier les raisons qui nous fait considérer certaines parties du 
passé comme «historiques», elle fournit des réponses à la question «Pourquoi écrire, étudier et aprendre  l’histoire?». Généralement, Droysen 
propose que l’étude de l’histoire ne doit être par assimilation des exemples pratiques ni par mémorisation de certains événements,  mais plutôt 
par l’apprentissage de ce qui a désigné la «pensée historique». Sur la base de cet argument, Droysen a contribué à la redéfinition de la  fonction 
didactique de l‘historiographie. Le présent texte caractérise et replace cette redéfinition et indique ses éventuelles limites.
Mots clés: théorie de l’histoire; enseignement de l’histoire; historiographie allemande, XIXe siècle.
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The didactic moment in the work of Droysen 
I n 1840, Droysen’s academic path suffered a major turnaround right after his being hired as a professor at the University of Kiel. By then, he had already completed his studies in Berlin, translated and commented dramas from 
Aeschylus and Aristophanes, and written an important biography of Alexander, 
The Great — followed by the two volumes of History of Hellenism. However, 
after moving to Northern Germany he relegates to the background his interest 
in the ancient world and starts devoting most part of his investigative attention 
to rather recent periods of the past.
The main reason for this change was of a political nature. Droysen was 
born around two years after the final colapse of the Holy Roman Empire , 
and most of his life took place in a moment in which, in the German cul-
tural space, there was no truly powerful political unit. The kind of his-
toriography he started to cultivate since about 1845 mirrored his desire 
to contribute, by means of historical interpretation, with a Prussian-led 
nation and state building process in Germany. It is in this spirit that one 
may understand his two great works in the history of what was then the 
present, namely the Lectures on the War of Liberation (1846) and the biog-
raphy of  Count Yorck von Wartenburg (1851–1852) — a Prussian war hero 
at the resistance war against the Napoleonic domination. The same may 
be said of that work which Droysen himself considered to be his most 
important work, The History of Prussian Politics, whose 14 volumes were 
published between 1855 and 1886.2
It is not useless to wonder about which would be for us the relevance of 
Droysen’s ouvre if he had dedicated himself solely to Prussian political history. 
In this case, we would probably have of him a perception not far from the one 
we have of Heinrich von Treitschke, a historian who is associated to a com-
plicated political ideology, to say the least, rather than to a research practice 
worthy of being praised.3 
This, however, does not happen with Droysen, basically for two reasons. 
The first one relates to the fact of Droysen having, in his early work, given to the 
concept of “Hellenism” the meaning of a concept of an epoch, which is preserved 
2The best critical study of Droysen’s personal and academic life — even if hypercritical as regards 
his theory of history — is the biography written by Wilfried Nipel, Johann Gustav Droysen. Ein Leben 
zwischen Wissenschaft und Politik, München, C.H. Beck, 2008. Before the publication of the text by 
Nipel, the reference work on the subject was the (unfinished) biography prepared by Droysen’s own son. 
See:: Gustav Droysen, Johann Gustav Droysen, 1. Teil: Bis zum Beginn der Frankfurter Tätigkeit, Leipzig, 
B.G. Teubner, 1910. For other important biographical studies, see: Otto Hintze, “Johann Gustav Droysen”. 
In: ______., Zur Theorie der Geschichte. Gesammelte Abhandlungen, Leipzig, Koehler & Amelang, 1942, p. 
150-213; Werner Obermann, Der Junge Johann Gustav Droysen: Ein Beitrag zur Entstehungsgeschichte 
des Historismus, PhD Thesis, Universität Bonn, Bonn, 1977; Stephan Paetrow, Johann Gustav Droysen in 
Jena. Ein Beitrag zur Entstehungsgeschichte von Droysens ‹Historik› und ‹Geschichte der preußischen 
Politik›, Saarbrücken, VDM, 2008; Jörn Rüsen, “Johann Gustav Droysen”, In: Hans-Ulrich Wehler (org.), 
Deutsche Historiker, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1973, p. 115-131. For biographical abstracts in 
Portuguese, see: Arthur Alfaix Assis, “Johann Gustav Droysen”, In: Estevão de Rezende Martins (org.), 
A história pensada. Teoria e método na historiografia européia do século XIX, São Paulo, Contexto, 2010, 
p. 31-36; Pedro Spinola Pereira Caldas, “Johann Gustav Droysen (1808–1884)”, In: Maurício Parada (org.), 
Os historiadores: clássicos da História. Vol. 2: from Tocqueville toThompson, Rio de Janeiro, PUC-Rio; 
Petrópolis, Vozes, 2013, p. 36-55.
3See: Andreas Dorpalen, “Heinrich von Treitschke”, Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 7, n. 3–4, 1972, p. 21-35.
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until today.4 But it is the second reason that interests us the most here: Droysen 
remains an author worth reading especially because of the reflections on theory 
and methodology of history he systematized on courses offered at the Universities 
of Jena and Berlin, between 1857 and 1883. Indeed, it is because of his theoreti-
cal texts that Droysen is often remembered by as a classical author, both by phil-
osophically minded historians and historically minded philosophers. Hannah 
Arendt, for example, remarked that he was “perhaps the most thoughtful of the 
nineteenth century historians ”. Hans Georg Gadamer emphasized Droysen’s 
significance for the development of modern hermeneutics, qualifying him as an 
“astute methodologist”. For Thomas Nipperdey, historian and author of one of 
the most respected histories of nineteenth-century Germany, Droysen was the 
“great theoretician of historicism”.5 The list of compliments may stop here, for the 
point we wish to illustrate is clear: according to the perception of several import-
ant analysts, in nineteenth-century Germany, Droysen was one of the authors 
who best dealt with the theoretical issues related to history and historiography.
The main perspective structuring Droysen’s theory of history follows the 
purpose of explaining the principles that regulate the work of professional his-
torians. Droysen used to open his lectures on historical theory stating that in 
his time, despite the  many research accomplishments creditable to his fellow 
historians, the most fundamental questions regarding the constitution of his-
torical knowledge remained lacking of clear answers.6 He chose to think, teach 
and write about theoretical and methodological issues after having diagnosed 
the need of clarifying historians as to the nature and importance of the histor-
ical discipline. For this reason, it may be said that Droysen’s theory of history 
is, first and foremost, a theory of historical science (Geschichtswissenschaft). 
It starts with a description of the specifics of the “historical  method”, i.e., a 
demonstration that all research procedures used by the historians follow rules 
which are characteristic of the historical discipline.7 Droysen, therefore, embraces 
4See, for example, Hans-Joachim Gehrke, Geschichte des Hellenismus, München, Oldenbourg, 2003, p. 1: “When 
we speak of Hellenism today as a hystorical era, we place ourselves within a tradition initiated by Johann Gustav 
Droysen”; Arnaldo Momigliano, “J.G. Droysen between Greeks and Jews”, History and Theory, vol. 9, n. 2, 1970, p. 
139-153: “It was J. G. Droysen who introduced the word Hellenism to designate the civilization of the Greek-speaking 
world after Alexander” (p. 139-140). Before Droysen, the term “Hellenism” was already in use, but its semantic field 
was restricted. The term was commonly used as a reference to the Greek-speaking Jews of the ancient world. See 
Arnaldo Momigliano, “J.G. Droysen between Greeks and Jews”, History and Theory, vol. 9, n. 2, 1970, p. 142.
5Hannah Arendt, Entre o passado e o futuro, São Paulo, Perspectiva, 2001, p. 110; Hans-Georg Gadamer, Verdade 
e método. Vol. 1: traços fundamentais de uma hermenêutica filosófica, Petrópolis, Vozes, 2008, p. 285; Thomas 
Nipperdey, Deutsche Geschichte 1800–1866. Bürgerwelt und starker Staat, München, C.H. Beck, 1998, p. 517.
6Johann Gustav Droysen, Historik. Vol. 1: Rekonstruktion der ersten vollständigen Fassung der Vorlesungen 
(1857); Grundriß der Historik in der ersten handschriftlichen (1857–1858) und in der letzten gedruckten 
Fassung (1882), edited by Peter Leyh, Stuttgart, Frommann-Holzboog, 1977, p. 3-4; 417.
7Frederick Beiser, The German historicist tradition, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 291; 298.
Droysen remains an author worth reading especially 
because of the reflections on theory and methodology 
of history he systematized on courses offered at the 
Universities of Jena and Berlin, between 1857 and 1883
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a scientific pluralism, and in line with this he works out a way of justifying history 
as an academic field of study located between philosophy and the natural sciences. 
In the most famous quote attributed to him, he states that the essence of the his-
torical method is the act of “understanding by means of research” (forschendes 
Verstehen).8 Such formulation conveys very well his argument that history occu-
pies an intermediate position between philosophy and natural sciences. On the 
one hand, contrary to philosophy (and also to theology), history is an empirical 
science. On the other, it refers to its empirical material in a way different from that 
of other sciences, as historians usually do not deal with recurring natural phe-
nomena, but with the singular products of human thinking and action instead.9 
Dorysen’s theory of history is, in fact, much more than a hermeneutic meth-
odology devised to determine the specificity of history vis-à-vis other forms of 
knowledge. It is, as demonstrated by Michael MacLean, embedded in strong eth-
ical and political motives.10 In addition, it covers a series of microtheories, which I 
could list here only briefly: a theory of the stages of historical research, a theory of 
historicity, a typology of historical representation, a social ethic, a political theory, 
among others.11 All this is tied together by an almost necessitarian religious vision 
of the historical process, based on which Droysen once suggested that “the most 
elevated task in historical science is, indeed, theodicy”,12 i.e., the justification of 
the existence of evil in a world created by an all-mighty God of infinite kindness.13
However, Droysen believed that historical science was coated, at the same 
time, by a somewhat more prosaic utility. It would be useful not only for try-
ing to cope with certain tensions inherent in the Christian religion, but also to 
other dimensions of human practical life. Therefore, it is no exaggeration to 
say that, for him, the historians’ activity is linked to the fulfillment of a good 
variety of functions of cultural orientation. To Droysen, historiography should 
not be practiced as an end in itself, as a kind of art for art’s sake moved by the 
pure desire to further understand a portion of the past. Instead, it should entail 
pragmatic interpretations of the present, interpretations capable of sponsor-
ing the kind of self-awareness he deemed necessary to assure the continuity of 
history as the objective process of humankind’s development.14 
8Johann Gustav Droysen, Historik. Vol. 1: Rekonstruktion der ersten vollständigen Fassung der Vorlesungen 
(1857); Grundriß der Historik in der ersten handschriftlichen (1857–1858) und in der letzten gedruckten 
Fassung (1882), edited by Peter Leyh, Stuttgart, Frommann-Holzboog, 1977, p. 22.
9For a detailed interpretation of the hermeneutic conception of historical method developed by Droysen, 
see Herbert Schnädelbach, Geschichtsphilosophie nach Hegel. Die Probleme des Historismus, Freiburg, Karl 
Alber, 1974, p. 101-111.
10Michael MacLean, “Johann Gustav Droysen and the development of historical hermeneutics”, History and 
Theory, vol. 21, n. 3, 1982, p. 347-365.
11For a more detailed panoramic view of Doysen’s theory of history, see Arthur Alfaix Assis, What is history for?, 
New York, Berghahn Books, 2014, p. 190-210.
12Johann Gustav Droysen, Historik. Vol. 2: Texte im Umkreis der Historik (1826–1882), edited by Horst Walter 
Blanke, Stuttgart, Frommann-Holzboog, 2007, p. 228.
13About the importance of  religion in Droysen’s conception of history, see: Wolfgang Hardtwig, 
“Geschichtsreligion – Wissenschaft als Arbeit – Objektivität. Der Historismus in neuer Sicht”, Historische 
Zeitschrift, n. 252, 1991, p. 1-32; Dirk Fleischer, “‘Geschichtserkenntnis als Goterkenntnis’. Das theologische 
Fundament der Geschichtstheorie Johann Gustav Droysens”, In: Horst Walter Blanke (ed.), Historie und 
Historik. 200 Jahre Johann Gustav Droysen, Köln, Böhlau, 2009, p. 73-89.
14Johann Gustav Droysen, op. cit., 2007, p. 377-379.
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According to Droysen, the active participation of people in historical life, 
that is, in the different levels of the “ethical world”, depends on the acquisition 
by them of a specific subjective competence that only historiography is capable 
of providing. This is the skill which allows one to attain the awareness that, in 
its current constitution, such world and its “spheres” (family, people, language, 
law, religion, economics, politics, among others) “are as they are because they 
have so become”.15 In this way, a person can arrive at a de-naturalized view of 
the historical process — in which this ceases to be passively experienced as an 
irresistible destiny and starts to show itself as a large-scale development over 
which one may try to exercise some kind of active influence. 
According to Droysen, the subjective awareness of the world’s historicity 
is one of the key safeguards to the continuity of the historical process. A noble 
objective he associates to the practice of historiography is precisely that of pro-
moting the dissemination and the improvement of such consciousness. “The task 
of the historical studies”, says Droysen succinctly, is that one learn how to think 
historically”.16 With this definition, he wanted to sensitize historians to practical 
impacts of historical knowledge which transcend the pure and simple under-
standing of the past. In fact, he wanted to strengthen the possibility that both 
readers and students of history, while acquiring knowledge of the past, would 
also be learning a certain reflexive competence: the capability of relating past 
and present in a historical way, that is, of enriching the current experience 
with the knowledge of the past experience. In other words: the  most import-
ant thing to be learned from  history is, for Droysen,  a general way of thinking, 
and not specific factual contents. This argument summarizes a good part of his 
general view of historiography as a form of practical knowledge, pointing at the 
same time to the centrality of the didactic reflections in his theory of history.
Rise and fall of the exemplary justification
In the long run, pragmatic definitions of the value of history, such as the one 
formulated by Droysen, were much more frequent than “autotelic” ones  , i.e., 
than those ones which ascribe to historiography an end in itself. However, there 
is more than only one way to grant practical value to history. For a long time, in 
Western historical thought, the mainstream of historiographical pragmatism 
was formed by a set of arguments which George Nadel called “exemplar the-
ory of history”.17 Later on, Droysen would establish his didactics of historical 
thinking exactly in opposition to this exemplarist didactics, so that to better 
understand the former, it is essential to cast an eye over the latter. 
15Johann Gustav Droysen, Historik. Vorlesungen über Enzyklopädie und Methodologie der Geschichte, edited 
by Rudolf Hübner, München, Oldenbourg, 1971, p. 301.
16Idem, Historik. Vol. 1: Rekonstruktion der ersten vollständigen Fassung der Vorlesungen (1857); Grundriß der 
Historik in der ersten handschriftlichen (1857–1858) und in der letzten gedruckten Fassung (1882), edited by 
Peter Leyh, Stuttgart, Frommann-Holzboog, 1977, p. 5. 
17George H. Nadel, “Philosophy of history before historicism”, History and Theory, vol. 3, n. 3, 1964, p. 291-315 
(esp. p. 292).
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Within this framework, exemplar theory of history corresponds to the idea 
that there is a practical reason for writing and studying history. More specifi-
cally, it regards the notion that history texts communicate to people of a given 
present models and anti-models of actions whose effectiveness has been tested 
in past situations. Thus, the relevance of histories would rely on their ability 
to provide their audience with political and/or moral learning, by means of 
examples of past deeds. 
The exemplary justification of historiography is no singularity of the Western 
tradition. In fact, it may be found in almost all of well-known historiograph-
ical cultures.  Specialized literature comprises, thousands of references to its 
related themes.18 Let us consider, for example, Ibn Khaldūn, the great classic 
of the Islamic historiography. His book on universal history was entitled Kitab 
al-Ibar, which may be translated as “Book of the examples”. In the introduction 
to the text, one reads the following: 
History make us acquainted with the conditions of past nations 
as they are reflected in their (national) character. It makes us 
acquainted with the biographies of the prophets and with the 
dynasties and the policies of the rulers. Whoever so desires may 
thus achieve the useful result of being able to imitate historical 
examples in religious or worldly matters.19
The trajectory of the Western branch of the exemplar theory of history is 
multifaceted. Its earliest records are found in the work of rhetoricians and his-
torians of the Hellenistic era.20 Polybius is perhaps the most notable exponent 
of this initial phase, with his definition of history as a means of training for the 
political life. However, it is from the Roman rethorician, Cicero, the expres-
sion which best summarizes the argument: historia magistra vitae. Over the 
centuries that separate us from both authors, the exemplar theory of history 
has acquired the different contours and features, combining with the stoic 
tradition, being assimilated by different variations of the Christian world view 
and associating itself to the modern raison d’état. Countless ancient, medi-
eval and modern intellectuals agreed (or would have agreed) to the old say-
ing that stated that history is no different from “philosophy teaching through 
examples”.21 A bit daring, one may say that, in the cultural universes of Western 
ancient, medieval and early modern times, despite the enormous transforma-
18See, for example, Ying-shih Yü, “Reflections on Chinese historical thinking”, In: Jörn Rüsen (org.), Western 
historical thinking: an intercultural debate, New York, Berghahn Books, 2002, p. 152-172 (esp. p. 158); David 
Schaberg, “Chinese history and philosophy”, In: Andrew Feldherr; Grant Hardy (eds.), The Oxford history of 
historical writing. Vol. 1: beginnings to AD 600, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 394-414; Romila Thapar, 
Ancient Indian social history. Some interpretations, New Delhi, Orient Blackswan, 2006, p. 253.
19Abū Zayd Ibn Khaldūn, The Muqaddimah. An introduction to history, vol. 1, Princeton, Princeton University 
Press, 1967, p. 15 (translated by the author).
20For François Hartog, the histories written in the classical period, by Herodotus and Thucydides, for example, 
do not reveal the predominance of justifications and exemplary uses. See François Hartog, Os antigos, o 
passado e o presente, Brasília, Editora da UnB, 2003, p. 53-70.
21This passage has long been attributed to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, important Greek historian of the 1st 
century BC. He is a part, most likely, of the textual set written only in the 2nd century AD. See Malcolm Heath, 
“Pseudo-Dionysius Art of Rhetoric 8–11: figured speech, declamation and criticism”, American Journal of 
Philology, vol. 124, 2003, p. 81-105.
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tions which mark the differences from one period to another, there was a rel-
ative cultural consensus regarding both history’s exemplary usefulness for life 
and historical examples’ pedagogical value.22 
The exemplary justification of historiography matches a didactics of his-
tory, a general conception of what historiography may teach and how one 
may learn something from it. The story of the rise and the fall of both of them 
in the Western world was well told by Nadel himself and, later on, by Reinhart 
Koselleck, and it is fairly known already.23 Based on the chronologies developed 
by those and by other authors, it may be stated that the exemplar theory of his-
tory remained as the predominant form of justification of historiography and 
of historical learning at least until the second half of the eighteenth century. 
As a work of fate, the most elaborated of the exemplary theories was pre-
pared exactly in the last decades of hegemony of this old way of defining his-
toriography’s value and function. It is found in the Letters on the study and 
use of history, written by Bolingbroke in 1735. This philosopher of aristocratic 
provenance trailed a meteoric trajectory in the English political scene of the 
early eighteenth century, but fell in disgrace after the enthronement of George 
I. Exiled more than once, with his political rights rounded up, his noble titles 
22Charles Fornara, The nature of history in ancient Greece and Rome, Berkeley, University of California 
Press, 1983, p. 104-120; Christian Meier, “Antiguidade”, In: Reinhart Koselleck et al., O conceito de história, 
Belo Horizonte, Autêntica, 2013, p. 37-62 (esp. p. 49-50; 57); Gabrielle Spiegel, “Political utility in Medieval 
historiography: a sketch”, History and Theory, vol. 14, n. 3, 1975, p. 314-325 (esp. p. 316-319); Odilo Engels, 
“Compreensão do conceito na Idade Média”, In: Reinhart Koselleck et al., op. cit., p. 63-84 (esp. p. 80); 
Rommily Jenkins, “The Hellenistic origins of Byzantine literature”, Dumbarton Oaks Papers, vol. 17, 1963, p. 
37-52 (esp. p. 50); Horst Günther, “Pensamento histórico no início da Idade Moderna”, In: Reinhart Koselleck 
et al., op. cit., 2013, p. 85-118 (esp. p. 90-93; 11-114); Felix Gilbert, Machiavelli and Guicciardini: politics and 
history in sixteenth century Florence, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1973, p. 228; Anthony Grafton, 
What was history? The art of history in early modern Europe, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2006, p. 31-32; Michel Jeanneret, “The vagaries of exemplarity: distortion or dismissal?”, Journal of the 
History of Ideas, vol. 59, n. 4, 1998, p. 565-579 (esp. p. 578-579).
23George Nadel, “Philosophy of history before historicism”, History and Theory, vol. 3, n. 3, 1964, p. 291-
315; Reinhart Koselleck, Futuro passado: contribuição à semântica dos tempos históricos, Rio de Janeiro, 
Contraponto; Editora da PUC-Rio, 2006, p. 41-60. On the issue, see also: Arthur Alfaix Assis, “Por que se 
escrevia história? Sobre a justificação da historiografia no mundo ocidental pré-moderno”, In: Marlon 
Salomon (org.), História, verdade e tempo, Chapecó, Argos, 2011, p. 105-132; Eckhard Keßler, “Geschichte: 
Menschliche Praxis oder kritische Wissenschaft? Zur Theorie der humanistischen Geschichtsschreibung”, In: 
Eckhard Keßler (org.), Theoretiker humanistischer Geschichtsschreibung. Nachdruck exemplarischer Texte 
aus dem 16. Jahrhundert, München, Wilhelm Finck, 1971, p. 7-47; Hermann Lübbe, Geschichtsbegriff und 
Geschichtsinteresse: Analytik und Pragmatik der Historie, Basel, Schwabe, 1977, p. 204-224; Ulrich Muhlack, 
Geschichtswissenschaft im Humanismus und in der Aufklärung. Die Vorgeschichte des Historismus, München, 
C.H. Beck, 1991, p. 44-66; Jörn Rüsen, História viva. Teoria da história III: formas e funções do conhecimento 
histórico, Brasília, Editora da  UnB, 2007, p. 50-55.
The relevance of the stories would rely on its 
ability to provide political and/or moral learning, 
mediated by examples of past deeds
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canceled and his properties being threatened, he retreats, at the end of his life, 
to the studying of philosophy and history.24   
The Letters on the study and the use are “one of the most important texts 
on the idea of history in England”.25 They testify to a stance on the value of his-
toriography that is set in open opposition to the notion, developed among 
chronologists, antiquarians and other users of the critical method, that historical 
knowledge would have a purpose in itself.26 Bolingbroke despises every and any 
factual research which is unrelated to genuine practical purposes and makes 
use of a quite expressive language in order to express his position. He says he 
prefers to slide into anachronism rather than to chase the “learned lumber that 
fills the head of an antiquary”. He compares grammarians and philologists to 
“drudges”, who find pleasure in getting themselves lost in the “dark mazes of 
Antiquity”. He considers that scholarship “that tends to make us neither better 
men and better citizens is at best but a specious and ingenious sort of idleness”.27 
Following this line of incisive criticism to scholarship for scholarship’s sake, 
Bolingbroke strongly argues in favor of the convenience of a historical peda-
gogy based in examples and contrary to the use of theoretical precepts. “Such 
is the imperfection of human understanding [...]”, he argues, “that general and 
abstract propositions, though ever so true, appear obscure and doubtful to us 
very often, till they are explained by examples, and that the wisest lessons in 
favour of virtue go but a little way to convince the judgment, and determine 
the will, unless they are enforced by the same means”.28  
However, in the following decades, the combination between Enlightenment 
and historicism which fed philosophical and historical thought in the German 
speaking countries give rise to a new set of expectations in relation to historiog-
raphy, and these would make the exemplary justification of historical learning 
seem more and more obsolete. I am refering here to the emergence of the mod-
ern concept of history, as analyzed by Koselleck. This concept summarizes a new 
way to make sense of time, in which this is perceived as a wide and progressive 
continuum connecting past and future with the intermediation of the present. 
One of the most fundamental arguments underlying Koselleck’s analysis is 
that the notion of history as the macroprocess of the development of humankind 
evolved at the same time as the perception of the singularity and uniqueness of 
historical events advanced. In fact, the idea that one was living in a radically new 
epoch, in the modern times, spread over part of the Western world from the late 
eighteenth century on. This impelled several philosophers and historians, espe-
cially from the German cultural space, to adopt an unprecedented attitude that 
24Isaac Kramnick, Bolingbroke and his circle: the politics of nostalgia in the age of Walpole, Ithaca, Cornell 
University Press, 1992, p. 8-16. See also: Philip Hicks, “Bolingbroke, Clarendon, and the Role of Classical 
Historian”, Eighteenth-Century Studies, vol. 20, n. 4, 1987, p. 445-471.
25George Nadel, “New lights on Bolingbroke’s letters on History”, Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 23, n. 4, 
1962, p. 550-557 (esp. p. 557). (translated by the author).
26Ulrich Muhlack, Geschichtswissenschaft im Humanismus und in der Aufklärung. Die Vorgeschichte des 
Historismus, München, C.H. Beck, 1991, p. 391.
27Bolingbroke (Henry St. John), Letters on the study and the use of history, London, T. Cadell, 1779, p. 9; 13-14.
28Idem, Ibidem, p. 15.
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favored the actual “temporalization” of past and present. The singularity of both 
past and present times started being emphasized. Proper historicization of past 
and present took on.  Finally, the growing tendency to temporalize the relation-
ship with the experience, made the past less directly relevant to the present.29 
This transformation of the concept of history, along with all the new possibilities 
of temporalization of the experience encouraged by it, also produced consequences 
on the way of defining the value and the function of historiography. By present-
ing itself as the key resource for the cognitive apprehension of a unique and unre-
peatable historical experience, historiography moves away from the old exempla-
riness.30 Indeed, observed from a logical perspective, historical examples may only 
claim general validity in the context of a representation of time which neutralizes 
the difference between the present and the past. Historically, such neutralization 
was often accomplished with the aid of a supra-temporal concept of human nature, 
i.e., by means of a fixed and invariable representation of the essence of humanity. 
The fact is that this modern emphasis in processuality, in the uniqueness of 
events, and in the historicity of human nature undermined one of the pillars of 
the exemplar theory of history, namely the idea that examples possess trans-his-
torical validity, that they apply for different temporal contexts. Some authors 
from the early nineteenth century seem to have had clear awareness of such 
conceptual changes. Hegel, for example, in the beginning of his Philosophy of 
history, peremptorily states: 
what experience and life teach is that the peoples and the govern-
ments never have learned anything from history and did not fol-
low the teachings it could have inspired. Each period is involved 
in such peculiar circumstances, exhibits a condition of things so 
strictly idiosyncratic, that its conduct must be regulated by con-
siderations connected with itself, and itself alone.31 
The same point reappears at the thought of one of the most versatile intel-
lectuals of the golden era of the German idealism, Wilhelm von Humboldt. 
According to him, “[history does not provide a service to life] when providing 
examples which must be followed or avoided, as this often leads to error and 
rarely teaches”.32
The redefinition of history as a practical knowledge
Despite these and other criticisms, very few were the authors who, in the eigh-
teenth and nineteenth centuries, have worked on a consistent answer to the 
29Reinhart Koselleck, “‘História’ como conceito mestre moderno”, In: Reinhart Koselleck et al., O conceito de 
história, Belo Horizonte, Autêntica, 2013, p. 185-222 (esp. p. 202-203); Idem, Futuro passado: contribuição à 
semântica dos tempos históricos, Rio de Janeiro, Contraponto; Editora da PUC-Rio, 2006, p. 55-56.
30Idem, “A configuração do moderno conceito de história”, In: Reinhart Koselleck et al., O conceito de história, 
Belo Horizonte, Autêntica, 2013, p. 119-184 (esp. p. 160-164).
31Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Filosofia da história, Brasília, Editora da UnB, 1999, p. 15.
32Wilhelm von Humboldt, “Sobre a tarefa do historiador”, In: Estevão de Rezende Martins (org.), A história pensada. 
Teoria e método na historiografia europeia do século XIX, São Paulo, Contexto, 2010, p. 82-100 (esp. p. 86).
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question: what is the use of history if not that of a life’s teacher? This is one of the 
circumstances which give particular importance to Droysen’s theory of history. 
Droysen was one of the first intellectuals to draw all the consequences of 
modern tendency to reprove the exemplary justifications of historiography. 
Acknowledging the inefectiveness of historical examples, he decides to read-
just the focus and reevaluate the goals of historical learning. For him, producers 
and receivers of historical knowledge should concentrate  not on the transmis-
sion and learning of concrete maxims of practical conduct, but on the devel-
opment of certain thinking skills. “Historical thinking” became then the label 
of a significant paradigm shift. 
As I have just indicated, Droysen’s definition is based on a decided rejec-
tion of the principles which provide support to the historical exemplarity. 
But it would be a great mistake to look upon this anti-exemplar attitude as a 
general disavowal of all possible pragmatic views of historiography. In fact, 
Droysen intended to rebuild, on new grounds, the old pragmatic bonds between 
history and life that were previously preserved in Cicero’s famous definition. 
Therefore it can be said that, in his notion of historical thinking, there was a 
relatively moderate attempt to replace the exemplar theory of history.
By giving such a centrality to “historical thinking”, Droysen was emphasizing 
his perception that history is always produced in the connection between past 
and present (and future, obviously). One way of translating this insight is with 
a truism: to think historically is the same as being able to place past and pres-
ent in historical perspective. Hence, the ability of thinking historically equals 
the ability to historicize the past and the present. For Droysen, historicizing the 
past necessarily implies a historical “perspectivation” of the subject of the his-
torical thinking in the present. Droysen expresses here the hard core of the 
historicist theory of knowledge, according to which the objective pasts made 
known by historians resonate within the subjects of knowledge (the historians) 
themselves and their respective audiences.33 To get to know the past with the 
help of a historical perspective is thus a way of self-knowledge. 
A key element of this historicist theory of knowledge is the idealist and neo-hu-
manist concept of Bildung. “That one learns how to think historically” is a term 
that points out to a formative, educative, claim —, in short, to Bildung. It is directly 
33Johann Gustav Droysen, Historik. Vol. 1: Rekonstruktion der ersten vollständigen Fassung der Vorlesungen 
(1857); Grundriß der Historik in der ersten handschriftlichen (1857–1858) und in der letzten gedruckten 
Fassung (1882), edited by Peter Leyh, Stuttgart, Frommann-Holzboog, 1977, p. 106.
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associated with the project of de-particularizing or universalizing the human self. 
For Droysen’s philosophical teacher, Hegel, Bildung  is opposed to both “physi-
cal subsistence” and the “singular character” of the human being.34 Bildung is, for 
him, that intellectual process which enables the individual to elevate her or himself 
towards what is generally human through a sacrifice of particularisms.35 Droysen 
puts this general idea of Bildung to work together with a non-exemplary idea of 
history and with the practice of historiography. He states that the 
purpose of history cannot be to provide models for imitation, or 
rules to be repeatedly applied. [...] What history leads to the soul, 
in order to form it, is a model of the essentials, of the decisive, the 
powerful; it is this strength of the great points of views. This way, 
the soul elevates itself over the little particularities, it learns how 
to feel great and to think from the I of the humankind.36 
Translated in general lines: for Droysen, historical thinking is one of the 
means of Bildung, a de-particularized way of shaping the human self resulting 
from the subjective internalization of the cultural reserves accumulated over 
the course of history of humankind.
It is interesting that, in the framework of Droysen’s universalist human-
ism, historical thinking is not only the foundation of a scientific method for 
arriving at knowledge of the human past. According to him, although histor-
ical knowledge is an obvious product of historical thinking, the latter,  dialec-
tically, also is the final goal of knowledge. This implies that historians have a 
task of not only thinking historically, but also of conveying to their readership 
the way of thinking that generally characterizes their work method. This way, 
the social transmission of historical thinking becomes the great educational 
function of historiography. Droysen approaches the issue of the transmission 
and acquisition of the ability of thinking historically by developing the parallel 
notion of “sense of reality”, which he borrowed from Wilhelm von Humboldt.37 
In Humbolt’s idealistic definition, the “sense of reality” corresponds to an ele-
mentary subjective competence that articulates historical perception. It is what 
allows a historian to cognitively capture the profound dynamics of historical 
reality and to see the forces at work behind the surface of the events. According 
to Humboldt, historians should not only apply such competences in order to 
represent past events, but also try to “awaken and enliven” the sense of reality 
of their addressees.38 
34Georg Friedrich Hegel, Nürnberger und Heidelberger Schriften: 1808–1817, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 
1986, p. 258.
35Rudolf Vierhaus, “Bildung’, In: Otto Brunner et al. (orgs.), Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: historisches lexikon 
zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland, vol. 1, Stuttgart, Klett-Cotta, 1979, p. 508-551 (esp. p. 535); 
Gadamer, Verdade e método. Vol. 1: traços fundamentais de uma hermenêutica filosófica, Petrópolis, Vozes, 
2008, p. 47-51. 
36Johann Gustav Droysen, Historik. Vol. 1: Rekonstruktion der ersten vollständigen Fassung der Vorlesungen 
(1857); Grundriß der Historik in der ersten handschriftlichen (1857–1858) und in der letzten gedruckten Fassung 
(1882), edited by Peter Leyh, Stuttgart, Frommann-Holzboog, 1977, p. 251-252 (translated by the author).
37Idem, Ibidem, p. 5; 40.
38Wilhelm von Humboldt, “Sobre a tarefa do historiador”, In: Estevão de Rezende Martins (org.), A história 
pensada. Teoria e método na historiografia europeia do século XIX, São Paulo, Contexto, 2010, p. 86.
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As can be seen, Humboldt’s methodological definition already includes a 
good amount of didactic features, and Droysen would later intensify and sys-
tematize them. For the latter, the sense of reality would be consolidated in read-
ers and students  of history, once they were able to apply the way of thinking 
learned from the histories to the understanding of their own present . In the 
non-exemplary didactic model projected by Droysen, history favors, first of all, 
the development of an ability which allows human subjects to realize the his-
toricity of their own present; to put on scale the historical conditions structur-
ing their own world.  This goes together with his expectation that the develop-
ment of the capacity to think historically would also reinforce in their subjects 
the the judgment skills necessary for reasonable decision-making and action. 
On the basis of this argumentone finds a multifaceted “historical reason”, i.e., 
a kind of rationality which is cognitive and practical at the same time, and 
that historians not only put into practice, but would also be able to convey to 
their audience. Such bond between knowledge and praxis, sealed by a form of 
rationality common to both of them, would later be placed in the foreground 
by Jörn Rüsen — not by chance, the contemporary philosopher of history who 
was most strongly inspired by Droysen’s historical theory.39
The contiguousness between the concepts of “historical thinking”, “sense 
of reality” and “Bildung” is one of the decisive proofs of the distance between 
the didactics of the history developed by Droysen and the one embedded in 
the “exemplar theory of history”. In his discussion of the “didactic narrative”, 
Droysen expresses a very clear awareness of such detachment. “It was”, he 
says, “the foundation of the falsely called pragmatic history that, from history, 
one should learn how to act in the future, in similar cases”.40 The expression 
“falsely called pragmatic history” refers here, of course, to the kind of histo-
riography which corresponds to the exemplar theory of history. In the quote, 
Droysen suggests that histories conceived according to  a pragmatism ori-
ented towards historical examples were no longer plausible. The form of his-
toriographical pragmatism that he accepted as valid was not the one which 
leads to the development of supratemporal catalogs of imitable or avoidable 
actions from the past. On the contrary, for him, a plausible historiographical 
pragmatism could only arise from the less direct form of orientation historical 
thinking provides to the human self. This form of orientation is summarized 
in the concept of Bildung, being to a good extent related to the enhancement 
of  the subjective capacity of judgment. Droysen clarifies the difference between 
the exemplary and the Bildung-related ways of historical learning, referring to 
a historiographical field of paramount importance in his time, military history. 
To the officers of an army, he points out, it would be more than interesting to 
study how the great generals of the past behaved in certain cases. But what an 
39Jörn Rüsen, Razão histórica. Teoria da história: os fundamentos da ciência histórica, Brasília, Editora da UnB, 
2001, p. 11-15.
40Johann Gustav Droysen, Historik. Vol. 1: Rekonstruktion der ersten vollständigen Fassung der Vorlesungen 
(1857); Grundriß der Historik in der ersten handschriftlichen (1857–1858) und in der letzten gedruckten 
Fassung (1882), edited by Peter Leyh, Stuttgart, Frommann-Holzboog, 1977, p. 250.
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officer can learn by reading factual war stories are no rules of conduct whose 
observance would ensure success on the battlefield. From histories he would, 
above all, learn how to gain “an understanding of what the human spirit has 
already undergone”. By reading them he would be performing a sort of “mental 
exercise”.41 To Droysen, the Bildung, the historical self-formation, corresponds 
exactly to this kind of “mental exercise” the case of military history illustrates. 
It should be noted that the argument here concerns not only military history 
in particular, but history in general. Just as the readers from armed forces, all 
other professionals  would not find in the histories concrete indications on how 
they should live their lives, or on what decision they should make. According 
to Droysen, the knowledge one may extract from reading and learning history 
is of a practical kind, but its practicality is neither exemplary nor immediate. 
The current and the obsolete
It is never too much to recall that the mode of historical education theorized 
by Droysen is the product of a political and cultural scenario which is quite 
different from ours. It went hand in hand with a view of politics and society 
that was antidemocratic and not entirely liberal, — even when judged by the 
standards of its own time.42 Especially after the failed attempt to reunite the 
German countries launched by the National Assembly established in Frankfurt, 
in 1848, Droysen’s political texts start to indicate a downturn of interest in lib-
eral themes, such as the basic individual rights and civil freedom, as well as 
an increasing concentration on Realpolitik matters. In the political theory 
he delinieted in lectures given in 1850, we may read, for example, that “the 
essence of the state is to constitute itself as power, power inwards, and power 
outwards”.43 Later on, in his argument in favor of a strong state, Droysen even 
gets to the point of stating that the historical sciences should be located in the 
“realm of spiritual preparation for war”.44 
It is also not difficult to see that Droysen took historical thinking and sense 
of reality as competences restricted to a mere fraction of the society. In fact, as 
almost all theorists of history in the nineteenth century, he assumes that the 
truly historical transformations depend directly only on a few individuals, who 
he called “the artificers of history”. These were exactly the social actors whose 
ability to think historically Droysen wanted to see fostered.45 The social phi-
losophy implied here admits that, in practice, the potential capacity of histor-
ical consciousness is restricted to, for instance, princes, statesmen, bureau-
41Johann Gustav Droysen, Historik. Vol. 1: Rekonstruktion der ersten vollständigen Fassung der Vorlesungen 
(1857); Grundriß der Historik in der ersten handschriftlichen (1857–1858) und in der letzten gedruckten 
Fassung (1882), editado por Peter Leyh, Stuttgart, Frommann-Holzboog, 1977, p. 250-251.
42Robert Henry Handy, J.G. Droysen: the historian and German politics in the nineteenth century, PhD Thesis, 
Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., 1966, p. 87-99.
43Johann Gustav Droysen, Historik. Vol. 2: Texte im Umkreis der Historik (1826–1882), edited by Horst Walter 
Blanke, Stuttgart, Frommann-Holzboog, 2007, p. 322.
44Idem, Ibidem, p. 455.
45Johann Gustav Droysen, op. cit., p. 386-388.
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crats, military commanders and, of course, intellectuals — all of them male. 
Moreover, Droysen’s first concern was to promote the historical thinking of 
German statesmen, bureaucrats, intellectuals, and military personnel, and not 
necessarily that of people of other nationalities. And here it is still necessary to 
remember: he believed that political and social elites, once they became able 
to think historically, would automatically reach the conclusion — which he 
obviously endorsed — that Prussia was invested with the great historical mis-
sion of unifying the German states, and thereby of ensuring the continuity of 
the historical process itself.46 
Therefore, in theory, Droysen defined the historical thinking in an open and 
universalistic way, but this universalism is sometimes lost in the application, so 
to speak, as in the concrete circumstances under which he lived he often made 
political and historiographical choices that qualify as very particularistic.47
These imbalances between Droysen’s theoretical didactics of the historical 
thinking and its concrete practical applications point to the complex question 
of of whether and in which way the author’s ideas might still be regarded as a 
good key to the issue of the function of historical knowledge today. I believe 
there are reasons to say that, essentially,  Droysen’s answer to the question 
“why”, i.e., why should one research, teach and learn history, still holds up.48 
This is so, first of all, for the simple reason that the ability to think historically, 
which Droysen associates to historical learning, is not necessarily linked to 
any fixed canon of content. The contents of our historical thinking, the objects 
over which our ability to historicize may act, do not necessarily need to be 
the same ones privileged by Droysen. In fact, historical thinking, as theorized 
by Droysen, can be taken as a merely formal competence that fits in with any 
content of experience and is adaptable to several different sets of norms and 
values. Droysen’s preference for dealing with political themes from a German, 
pro-Prussian, male, academic, bourgeois and anti-democratic point of view 
does not necessarily need to be ours.  We might (and should) balance our own 
perspective differently, and keep thinking historically as well. Nothing pre-
vents us, for example, of thinking historically about cultural phenomena from 
a female or a Marxist point of view; or about economic themes from a conser-
vative point of view, and so on.
Secondly, it should be stressed that Droysen’s theoretical work was already 
constituted within the same horizon of basic ideas that still characterizes a sig-
nificant a good part of the current reflection on historical learning.
 Among contemporary experts in history education it is widely consensual 
that the aim of teaching history at schools and of historical learning in gen-
eral should not be the simple transmission/acquisition of factual information. 
46Johann Gustav Droysen, Politische Schriften, edited by Felix Gilbert, München, R. Oldenbourg, 1933, 
p. 228-229.
47I myself tried elsewhere to explain this dissonance between theory and practice in Droysen’s thinking. See 
Arthur Alfaix Assis, What is history for?, New York, Berghahn Books, 2014, esp. p. 146-170.
48For a good overall Picture of the work of Droysen (in addition to indications on the history of its reception), 
see Pedro Spinola Pereira Caldas, “A atualidade de Johann Gustav Droysen: uma pequena história de seu 
esquecimento e de suas interpretações”, Locus, vol. 12, n. 1, 2006, p. 95-111.
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For some decades this consensus on the inadequacy of a purely factualist con-
ception of history teaching has been stimulating the circulation of positive 
definitions regarding the objectives of historical learning. Two concepts which 
summarize a good part of these definitions are widely coincident: “historical 
thinking” and “historical consciousness”.49 
But it is also important to keep in mind that the line that goes from Droysen’s 
didactics of the history of to us is not so direct and that the references to his 
ideas in contemporary debates are, above all, scarce. Besides that, the gener-
ality of such didactic concepts predisposes  their uses and meanings to vary 
quite a lot. The generic consensus on the need to stimulate the development 
of historical consciousness sometimes overlaps the cacophony of conflicting 
understandings as to what specifically would such an awareness be, but cer-
tainly does not muffles it. In any case, the history of the different mediations that 
led from Droysen’s justification  for the study of history to the current didactic 
reflections is yet to be told.  
Thirdly and lastly, the relative curentness of Droysen’s didactic definitions 
refers us back to the  much more general issue of the legacy of historicism. 
Droysen’s arguments on the value and function of history are an important part 
of the “spiritual revolution” promoted by the rise of historicism between the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, especially (but not only) in Germany.50 
49See, for example, Bodo von Borries, Historisch Denken Lernen. Welterschließung statt Epochenüberblick. 
Geschichte als Unterrichtsfach und Bildungsaufgabe, Opladen, Barbara Budrich, 2008; Ignacio Muñoz 
Delaunoy, “La historia y sus funciones”, In: Ignacio Muñoz Delaunoy; Luis Osandón Millavil (orgs.), La didáctica 
de la historia y la formación de ciudadanos en el mundo actual, Santiago, Ediciones de la Dirección de 
Bibliotecas Archivos y Museos, 2013, p. 25-43 (esp. p. 39-40); Karl-Ernst Jeismann, “Geschichtsbewußtsein 
– Theorie”, In: Klaus Bergmann et al. (orgs.), Handbuch der Geschichtsdidaktik, Seelze-Velber, Kallmeyer, 
1997, p. 42-45; Hans-Jürgen Pandel, Geschichtsunterricht nach PISA. Kompetenzen, Bildungsstandards und 
Kerncurricula, Schwalbach am Taunus, Wochenschau, 2007; Pieter van Veuren, “Does it make sense to teach 
history through thinking skills?”, Koers, vol. 60, n. 1, 1995, p. 29-39; Sam Wineburg, Historical thinking and other 
unnatural acts. Charting the future of teaching the past, Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 2001. The 
same is true for the Brazilian debate on the subject. See, for example, Oldimar Cardoso, “Para uma definição 
de didática da História”, Revista Brasileira de História, vol. 28, n. 55, 2008, p. 153-170; Luis Fernando Cerri, 
“Didática da História: uma leitura teórica sobre a História na prática”, Revista de História Regional, vol. 15, n. 2, 
2010, p. 264-278; Estevão de Rezende Martins, “História: consciência, pensamento, cultura, ensino”, Educar em 
revista, n. 42, 2011, p. 43-58 (esp. p. 52-58); Rafael Saddi, “O parafuso da didática da História”, Acta Scientiarum 
Education, vol. 34, n. 2, 2012, p. 211-220.
50Friedrich Meinecke, “A formação do historicismo – considerações preliminares”, In: Jurandir Malerba (org.), 
Lições de História. Da história científica à crítica da razão metódica no limiar do século XX, Porto Alegre, 
EdiPUC-RS, 2013, p. 263-272 (esp. p. 263).
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I am speaking of “historicism” here in a broad sense, in the meaning of a way 
to explain the world structured around the belief that certain phenomena can 
be well understood by means of their historicization.51 “Historicization”, one 
should add, has actually two simultaneous meanings. It points both to the kind 
of cognition of things that focuses on the aspects that individualize them and 
to the perception of a given order of things as a (provisory) result in a tempo-
rally comprehensive process.52 Historicism is, therefore, a way of looking at the 
world which emphasizes the individuality and the transience of things.53 Its basic 
premise is that human phenomena are well understood only when one looks 
into what it is or was from the perspective of its own process of “becoming”.54 
However, since the late nineteenth century the historicist world view 
was repeatedly challenged. The intensification of social processes such as 
the industrialization of Germany, democratization, and secularization, as 
well as the advent of the World War I, lowered the credibility of the way of 
justifying values and norms that was favored in the classic era of histori-
cism.55 Moreover, the claim made by classical historicism that it consisted 
in the only legitimate way of approaching the human affairs was watered 
down after the consolidation of a- or anti-historical approaches devel-
oped in economics, linguistics, psychology, sociology, anthropology and 
other sciences.56 Historicism’s reputation reached low level in the 1960s 
and the 1970s, when young historians aiming to refresh the German histo-
riographical scene with concepts and approaches originated in the social 
sciences defined their project as an attempt to “overcome historicism”.57 
To make matters worse, the post-World War II unease with developmental 
categories, such as progress or social evolution, and later the post-mod-
ern critique of metanarratives, would lay ground to even speaking of the 
51Hence, I am not talking about “historicism” in the meaning Karl Popper popularized. On the different 
meanings of the term, see Friedrich Jaeger, “Historismus”, In: Friedrich Jaeger (org.), Enzyklopädie der Neuzeit. 
Vol. 5, org., Stuttgart, J.B. Metzler, 2007, p. 532-539. In the translation of “Historismus”, I opted by the use of 
“historicism” over “historism”, because the first one is the terminology most commonly used among non-
German scholars specializing in the subject.
52Maurice Mandelbaum, History, man, & reason: a study in nineteenth-century thought, Baltimore, The Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1971, p. 41-43.
53Beiser, The German historicist tradition, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 2-5. 
54Johann Gustav Droysen, Historik. Vol. 1: Rekonstruktion der ersten vollständigen Fassung der 
Vorlesungen (1857); Grundriß der Historik in der ersten handschriftlichen (1857–1858) und in der letzten 
gedruckten Fassung (1882), edited by Peter Leyh, Stuttgart, Frommann-Holzboog, 1977, p. 162; Idem, 
Historik. Vol. 2: Texte im Umkreis der Historik (1826–1882), edited by Horst Walter Blanke, Stuttgart, 
Frommann-Holzboog, 2007, p. 508.
55Herman Paul, “A collapse of trust: reconceptualizing the crisis of historicism”, Journal of the Philosophy of 
History, vol. 2, n. 1, 2008, p. 63-82 (esp. p. 73-74).
56Reinhart Koselleck, “Wozu noch Historie?”, In: Wolfgang Hardtwig (org.), Über das Studium der Geschichte, 
München, DTV, p. 347-365 (esp. p. 348-351). 
57René Gertz, “O historicismo e a moderna história social alemã”, In: Flávia Varella et al. (orgs.), A dinâmica do 
historicismo. Revisitando a historiografia moderna, Belo Horizonte, Argumentum, 2008, p. 149-168 (esp. p. 151 
et seq.); Thomas Welskopp, “Limites e perspectivas da ciência social histórica”, História da Historiografia, n. 6, 
2011, p. 14-41 (esp. p. 19).
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expendabilityof the concept of history and the historiographical tradi-
tion itself.58 
All this conflicts with Droysen’s notion of historical thinking and with the his-
torical didactics bound to it. But I do not believe this is enough of a motive in order 
for us to relegate to the limbo Droysen’s theoretical legacy, and much less that of 
both  historicism and the modern historiographical tradition. Most part of  the 
literature on the “crisis of historicism” dramatizes too much on the impacts of 
such crisis, which seems to have been really traumatic only in the field of biblical 
philology and for the neo-Kantian reflection on the foundation of universal val-
ues.59 In other fields the impact of historicization seems to have been less harsh, 
neutral or even positive. As an example it suffices to regard an interdisciplinary 
approach that is very well esteemed nowadays, the history of concepts. To a large 
extent, this approach emerged out of a tendency towards the historicization of 
philosophy that advanced in nineteenth-century Germany.60
Anyway, the many “crises” of historicism may have not been strong enough 
to invalidate the position according to which a privileged way of understand-
ing the human worlds of the past and the present is to focus on sets of transfor-
mations which produced certain orders of individualizable things. It also does 
not seem to have led us to conclude that there would be something wrong in 
trying to enhance the understanding of the present with the understanding 
of the past and vice versa. After all, how many real historians seem to be seri-
ously willing to give up the cognitive procedures united in the term “histori-
cizing”? As was well observed by Sérgio da Mata, “a radically anti-historicist 
history ceases to be history”.61
As it turns out, I particularly advocate that historicism and its related didac-
tics of history remain relevant. Historicism composed, among other things, a 
general description of what is at stake in historiographical practice, which, in 
my opinion, is to the day one of the best offers available in the market of theo-
ries of history. Now, it is a description composed many decades ago, with the 
help of an idealist vocabulary that has long stoped being satisfactory.62 It is 
difficult to associate the work of historians of today to the inquiry into “ethical 
forces”, or “the becoming ideas”, to the task of “theodicy”, or to concepts such 
as “spirit”, “self of the humankind”, “national spirit”, “artificers of history”, to 
name only a few examples extracted from Droysen’s work. And even the term 
Bildung, with its endless difficulties of translation and its intricate mystical, 
58For a critical review on such general diagnoses, see Pietro Rossi, Naufrágio sem espectador: a idéia de 
progresso, São Paulo, Editora da Unesp, 2000, p. 122-132. For a radical critique of historiography, in which it is 
argued that nowadays both the concept of history and the knowledge produced by academic historians are 
dispensable, see Keith Jenkins, Why history? Ethics and postmodernity, London, Routledge, 1999, p. 1.
59Allan Megill, “Why was there a crisis of historicism?”, History and Theory, vol. 36, n. 3, 1997, p. 416-429 (esp. p. 
419-422); Frank Ankersmit, Meaning, truth, and reference in historical representation, Ithaca, Cornell University 
Press, 2012, p. 5-7.
60Gunter Scholtz, “Begriffsgeschichte als historische Philosophie und philosophische Historie”, In: Hans 
Joas; Peter Vogt (eds.), Begriffene Geschichte. Beiträge zum Werk Reinhart Kosellecks, Frankfurt am Main, 
Suhrkamp, 2011, p. 264-287.
61Sérgio da Mata, “Elogio do historicismo”, In: Flávia Varella et al. (orgs.), A dinâmica do historicismo. Revisitando 
a historiografia moderna, Belo Horizonte, Argumentum, 2008, p. 49-62 (esp. p. 55).
62Ankersmit, Meaning, truth, and reference in historical representation, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2012, p. 256.
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religious, psychological and philosophical connotations, may not be the best 
choice for the international reflection on historical learning. None of this inter-
feres, however, in the central premises of historicism. They may and must, as 
Frank Ankersmit has recently suggested, be translated in a more contempora-
neous vocabulary.63 Such a translation that not only interprets, but also tries 
to update Droysen’s historicist didactics , corresponds to a good part of what 
I have just attempted to do.
63Ankersmit, Meaning, truth, and reference in historical representation, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2012, p. 1-2.
